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c h a p t e r  7
Decalogue Five: A Short Film about 
Killing, Sin, and Community
Michael Baur
Decalogue Five tells the story of Waldemar Rekowski ( Jan Tesarz), a jaded 
taxi driver, Piotr Balicki (Krzysztof Globisz), an idealistic, newly-licensed 
attorney, and Jacek Lazar (Mirosław Baka), a young and troubled drifter, 
whose lives intersect with one another as a result of fate, or contingent 
circumstance, or some combination of both. With brutal detail and de-
tachment, the ﬁ lm depicts Jacek’s seemingly aimless wanderings through 
Warsaw, his senseless killing of Waldemar, his interactions with Piotr (his 
court-appointed attorney), and his eventual execution after a failed defense 
in court. Like other ﬁ lms within the Decalogue series, Five illustrates what 
happens when human beings are forced to confront ethical dilemmas (and 
thus are forced to confront themselves as responsible moral decision makers) 
in a world that seems to offer little in the way of moral direction, meaning, 
purpose, and community with others. Discussing the overarching aim of the 
Decalogue series as a whole, Krzysztof Kies´lowski refers to the sense of alien-
ation, aimlessness, and loneliness that often describes the human condition:
Decalogue is an attempt to narrate ten stories about ten or twenty 
individuals, who—caught in a struggle precisely because of these and 
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not other circumstances, circumstances which are ﬁ ctitious but which 
could occur in everyday life—suddenly realize that they’re going round 
and round in circles, that they’re not achieving what they want.1
Of the three main characters in Five, two in particular—Jacek and Wal-
demar—seem to illustrate the directionless, alienated form of existence 
that constitutes the subject matter of the Decalogue series as a whole. Paul 
Coates describes Jacek’s aimless and menacing wanderings throughout the 
city as the wanderings of someone who “stalks Warsaw like an edgy, exis-
tential angel of doom.”2 While Waldemar appears to be better off in some 
respects—he is married and employed, after all—it is apparent that he 
does not share much affection with his fellow citizens. When we ﬁ rst meet 
Waldemar, we see him walking around the housing complex where he lives 
and narrowly escaping being hit by a clump of wet, dirty rags thrown down 
at him from a resident above.
In general, Jacek and Waldemar seem not to care much about the world 
that surrounds them, and the world, in turn, seems to care little about 
them. Neither Jacek nor Waldemar is especially likable, and both are seen 
to be capable of violence and callousness as they interact— or fail to inter-
act—with their fellow citizens. For example, we see Jacek attack another 
young man in a public restroom and throw him violently into a urinal, 
all for no apparent reason. Also for no apparent reason, Jacek runs into a 
crowd of pigeons being fed in a public square, scaring the pigeons away 
from the woman who had been trying to feed them. While on a highway 
overpass, Jacek places a rock on the overpass ledge and nudges it until it 
falls off into trafﬁ c below, causing what sounds like a serious and perhaps 
even fatal accident. After ﬁ nishing his coffee and cake in a local café, Jacek 
leaves a large dollop of spit in his empty coffee cup; then, before leaving the 
café, he ﬂ ings a large spoonful of leftover food at the café’s window, where 
two little girls had been standing and looking in on him.
Although Waldemar is a more established and gainfully employed 
member of society, he also has his moments of callousness and cruelty. 
While washing his taxicab, Waldemar takes his time and shows no sympa-
thy or concern for the couple (Dorota and her husband from Two), who, 
after asking for a ride, waits patiently for him at the taxi stand. Once he is 
ﬁ nished washing his taxi, he drives off without saying a word to the couple, 
leaving them stranded in the cold. While driving his taxi, Waldemar honks 
his horn at a man and his two dogs as they pass by, for no reason other 
than to witness the frightened reaction of the man and his dogs. In another 
scene, while Waldemar waits near the taxi stand, we see him ogling the 
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young girl at the nearby vegetable kiosk and trying to look up her skirt as 
she reaches to receive vegetables from a delivery truck. And in a selﬁ sh act 
that will indirectly lead to his demise, Waldemar quickly drives off rather 
than giving a ride to an obviously inebriated man being helped by a friend 
to the taxi stand. In so doing, Waldemar keeps himself available to pick up 
Jacek as his next and—as it turns out—ﬁ nal passenger.
While both Jacek and Waldemar are unlikable in many respects, they 
display at least a few redeeming qualities. For example, Jacek shows genu-
ine affection for others, especially for young girls, as is evident from the 
way he pensively observes the images of young girls being displayed in the 
window of the photography shop, and by the way he thoughtfully looks on 
as the street artist draws a portrait of the young girl sitting for him. There 
is at least a hint of genuine humanity and kindness in Waldemar when he 
decides to share half of his sandwich with a hungry stray dog. However, we 
should not think that these better and worse impulses reside in Jacek and 
Waldemar alongside one another as two entirely distinct and separable sides 
of their characters. It is an undeniable fact of human nature and psychol-
ogy that some of our cruelest and most antisocial impulses are intimately 
bound up with our impulses toward genuine affection and community with 
others. Thus, Jacek’s ﬂ inging of food in the direction of the little girls at the 
café window may certainly be understood as a sign of aggression, but just 
as plausibly it may also be understood as an attempt—though perhaps an 
awkward one—at sharing a laugh with them. The dual character of Jacek’s 
act is clearly indicated by the ambivalent reaction of the little girls. As they 
turn to run away from the café window, the girls laugh, but their laugh is 
not an entirely comfortable one; while they laugh, their faces also show 
the uneasy awareness that Jacek’s act of ﬂ inging food in their direction was 
not just (potentially) funny, but menacing and aggressive as well. A similar 
duality can be seen in Waldemar’s act of sharing half of his sandwich with 
the stray dog. On the one hand, Waldemar’s act may be understood as 
a sign of genuine kindness and concern for another needy, living being. 
On the other hand, as the ﬁ lm makes clear, the sandwich that Waldemar 
shares with the stray dog is a sandwich that had been prepared for him 
by his wife; and so, this very act of sharing might equally be understood 
as a sign of disdain for the wife, as if Waldemar were telling himself that 
the sandwich prepared for him by his own wife is really only ﬁ t for a dog.
Of course, we cannot be entirely sure what to make of these acts by Jacek 
and Waldemar. They are acts that seemingly and inextricably bind together 
cruelty and kindness. But this seems to be one of the points that Kies´lowski 
wishes to make about the human state. Given our alienated and warped 
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condition, it is often the case that we humans simply do not know how to 
actualize our better impulses without also giving reign to our worse im-
pulses. That is, we simply do not know how to reach out to others and seek 
community with them, without also introducing into our actions certain 
elements of callousness, cruelty, or aggression.3 Indeed, one of the overrid-
ing lessons that emerges in Five and in the rest of the Decalogue series is that 
the systems or institutions which we humans have created for ourselves—
systems that are supposed to enable us to achieve our better aspirations and 
goals— often conspire to frustrate our better strivings and to convince us 
that our strivings are in vain. In Five, the problematic systems within which 
we live—including our political systems, our systems of modern science 
and technology, the system of incentives and punishments known as the 
law, and the system of organized religion—are visually hinted at through 
Warsaw’s Inﬂ ancka housing complex, which is the setting for much of the 
action in the Decalogue series as a whole. Like the housing complex, these 
systems often give people shelter for living, but not for living well; like the 
housing complex, they allow large numbers of people to live together, but 
they often frustrate our strivings for genuine togetherness and commu-
nity. And so we often ﬁ nd ourselves trying to actualize our better impulses 
precisely in ways that seem destined to fail; and thus in ways that lead to 
a sense of frustration, aggression, and lack of direction. Just as Kies´lowski 
said of the characters in The Decalogue, we too ﬁ nd ourselves “going 
round and round in circles” and “not achieving what we want” (KK, 145).
The Roman Catholic tradition (including the tradition that is very 
much part of Kies´lowski’s native Poland) has a name for the mechanism 
by which systems of our own making regularly frustrate, stunt, and warp 
our better aspirations toward genuine sharing and community with oth-
ers. The tradition’s name for this mechanism is original sin. Of course, 
we should be very careful about attributing to Kies´lowski a theological 
outlook that is foreign to his own. It is well known that Kies´lowski did not 
feel great attachment to the Roman Catholic Church, and—as one critic 
has observed—he did not have “much use for institutional Christianity” in 
general.4 But in spite of his own critical self-distancing from institutional 
religion in general and from the Roman Catholic Church in particular, it 
is possible that Kies´lowski’s view of the human condition does indeed re-
ﬂ ect certain views espoused, though in some cases also misunderstood, by 
proponents of institutionalized religion.
The point of original sin—as opposed to sin that is not original—is 
that it affects us in our very beginnings, our very origins, our very coming-
into-being. It is not the kind of sin that arises out of misjudgments or bad 
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choices by the individual alone. It is original in the sense that it character-
izes the human condition through which we have our very being. But what 
is this human condition? Signiﬁ cantly, the human condition is a condi-
tion of interpersonal interdependence and socialization. The philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre has described the human condition as the condition of 
“dependent rational animals”:5 We depend on others not only because our 
biological needs have to be met (though that is certainly the case), but also, 
and more important, because we need others in order to acquire the virtues 
without which we could not be the rational, human agents that we aspire 
to be. The human being is by nature a social animal, and thus we humans 
need others in order to become what we truly are as human beings. When 
we do not have the help and support of others, we quite literally do not 
have ourselves. I have my being and my humanity by virtue of the com-
munication, mutual support, and sharing that I have with others, but be-
cause of this, if there is any failing, perversion, or distortion in the means 
and mechanisms of my sharing and communicating with others, there is 
equally a failing, perversion, or distortion in my very own being. This is 
what original sin refers to: the perversion or distortion that is inscribed in 
my very being, insofar as my very being depends on systems of communi-
cation and sharing that are themselves perverted or distorted.
Furthermore, original sin cannot be eradicated through the initiative of 
individuals (even if this initiative were widespread or even universal among 
individuals) to treat each other better and more humanely. The point of 
original sin is that the failed, alienating systems within which we live will 
always persist at disguising themselves, justifying themselves, and co- opting 
for their own ends the very weapons that we might fashion in order to op-
pose them. The problem of original sin is helpfully explained by Herbert 
McCabe, one of the twentieth century’s most refreshingly creative and yet 
reliable expositors of the Roman Catholic faith. As McCabe writes,
The point is that we are born into a society which in various ways fails 
us as we stand in need of love. And for this reason we are born crippled 
(using the word “born” in a more extended sense). And our society does 
not fail us simply because of the ill will of individual members but be-
cause of the structures it represents, because of the role it assigns these 
members. You could be born and brought up in a group who were all 
individually saints and you would still be subject to the deprivation we 
call the Sin of the World.6
We depend on others for our own humanity, and yet the systems that 
we create for our own humanity systematically fail us, not because of any 
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particular shortcoming on the part of individuals, but because of the dis-
tortions and perversions embedded within the systems and media through 
which we relate to each other and communicate with each other. These 
systems cannot be corrected by better, kinder decisions by individuals, 
because the distorting powers embedded in these systems exceed our abil-
ity, individually and collectively, to control them. They will always co-opt 
our best efforts to counteract them, since each of us (dependent on such 
systems of communication and socialization for our very humanity) can-
not escape operating from within the means provided by these systems 
themselves.
The problem is illustrated by the change in Piotr’s thinking over the 
course of Five. Near the beginning of the ﬁ lm, Piotr suggests that the 
law (or “the application of justice”) might “correct the mistakes” of “a gi-
ant machine” which tends to dominate our lives. By the end of the ﬁ lm, 
however, Piotr has grown to realize that the law itself has been co-opted 
by and made to do the bidding of this giant, anonymous, and ineluctable 
machine.
It is worthwhile to say more at this point about the connection between 
original sin and our need to live within systems of socialization and com-
munication with others. On one level or another, all material beings in 
the universe interact with their environments, which is to say that they 
exist in community or in communication with other material beings. But 
the character of such interaction and communication varies, depending on 
the degree of excellence represented by the kind of being in question. In 
general, the higher or more excellent kinds of material beings are capable 
of more excellent kinds of communication (more complete and more inti-
mate kinds of sharing) with other beings. But it is precisely because of their 
more excellent and higher degrees of communication with others that such 
higher beings also face greater risks, greater vulnerabilities, and greater 
chances for failure and perversion than lower beings do. One might say 
that there is a dialectical relationship between degrees of excellence and 
degrees of risk within the universe of material beings, and it is this dialecti-
cal relationship that helps us to better understand what original sin is, and 
how it is shown to manifest itself in Five.
Consider, for example, the ways in which animate beings are more ex-
cellent than inanimate beings and thus capable of greater degrees of com-
munication and sharing with other beings. Unlike inanimate things, liv-
ing beings maintain themselves in existence (qua living) precisely by not 
limiting themselves to being determined by the material components that 
happen to constitute them at any given moment, but instead by actively 
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engaging in the process of metabolism, or the ongoing exchange or sharing 
of energy and matter with beings in the surrounding environment. Com-
pared with nonliving things, living beings display a greater degree of excel-
lence or a greater degree of immateriality, that is, a greater degree of free-
dom from being determined by their underlying material conditions. It is 
by virtue of this greater degree of excellence and immateriality that living 
beings are capable of sharing and communicating with other beings more 
fully and intimately. Thus, living beings maintain their existence, not by 
insulating themselves against the physical and chemical intrusions of other 
beings, but precisely by inviting such intrusions, or by making themselves 
relatively permeable and by participating in an ongoing process of material 
and caloric exchange with the environment. But because of their greater de-
gree of excellence and immateriality (and thus  because of their greater ca-
pacity for communication and sharing), living beings also face greater 
risks, greater vulnerabilities, and greater chances of failure or perversion 
than nonliving beings do. Simply stated, there are more things that can go 
wrong with the living being; the living being can fail in many more ways 
than nonliving beings can. Thus if the living being should cease to engage 
in the active exchange of energy and matter with its environment, it will 
die, which is to say that it will fail at being a living being. By contrast, 
nonliving beings maintain themselves as what they are, precisely by being 
inert, by not engaging in the exchange of matter and energy with their 
environments. The difference between living and nonliving beings helps 
to illustrate why a greater degree of excellence and immateriality entails 
a greater capacity for communication and sharing with other beings, but 
also a greater degree of vulnerability and a more daunting set of challenges 
for succeeding at being the kind of being that one is.
The same general observation can be made about the contrast between 
sentient living beings (animals) and nonsentient living beings (plants). 
When compared with plants, animals display a greater degree of excel-
lence and immateriality, and thus a greater capacity for communication 
and sharing with other beings. Unlike plants, animals are capable of ac-
quiring sensory knowledge about other beings in their environment. This 
sensory knowledge, in turn, allows animals to direct themselves toward 
sources of nourishment and away from sources of danger. On account of 
such motility, animals are not limited to nourishing themselves (they are 
not limited to engaging in metabolic exchanges) with material resources 
that happen to be contiguous with their own bodies. Because they are 
sentient, animals can also be motile, which is to say that they can move 
under their own power away from the spatial regions in which they imme-
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diately ﬁ nd themselves, and into regions where the ongoing availability of 
nourishment will depend not just on what the environment provides, but 
also on the animal’s riskier and less assured performance of several higher-
 order, sensory-based interactions with the environment. Thus, in order to 
survive, the animal must be attentive at the right times, it must be able to 
move about in its surroundings with relative ease, it must be able to ﬁ nd 
food and evade predators; notice that the success of the animal’s interac-
tions with the environment will depend, crucially, on what other animals 
do as well. To extend an observation made earlier: There are simply more, 
and more varied, ways in which the animal can fail at being an animal than 
there are ways in which the plant can fail at being a plant. Because of its 
greater degree of excellence and immateriality, the animal communicates 
and interacts with its environment in a more excellent way than plants 
do, but also, on account of its greater degree of excellence, it also faces 
greater risks and dangers. Animals purchase greater freedom, greater self-
 determination, and a greater capacity for interacting with other beings, 
but only by exposing themselves to the possibility of failing more miser-
ably, and in more ways, at being the kinds of beings that they are.
The preceding set of observations can now be extended to illustrate the 
difference between nonrational (nonhuman) animals and rational (human) 
animals, and to explain the signiﬁ cance of this distinction for the notion 
of original sin. When compared to nonhuman animals, humans display a 
greater degree of excellence and immateriality, and this, in turn, entails a 
greater capacity for communication and sharing with other beings. Thus, 
it is on account of their rational (i.e., their conceptual or linguistic) capaci-
ties that human beings can understand and share in meanings and perspec-
tives that would be entirely closed off to them if left to their own devices 
as merely sentient beings. Human beings become genuinely rational and 
free, that is, they become capable of apprehending the nonparticularized 
meanings of particular things or events, only because of their capacity to 
communicate with others conceptually and linguistically.7
Now we saw above that living beings succeed at being what they are 
(they remain alive) only by maintaining themselves as active sites for the 
processing of material and caloric resources that are drawn from environ-
ments that are not of their own making and not subject to their exclu-
sive control as individuals; hence the unavoidable risk and vulnerability 
attendant upon all animate beings. In a similar fashion, we can say that 
human beings succeed at what they are (they are rational and free) only by 
maintaining themselves as active sites for the processing of conceptual and 
linguistic resources which are drawn from traditions and communities that 
F6707.indb   129 4/7/16   6:58:02 AM
This content downloaded from 24.47.19.44 on Sun, 28 Jan 2018 21:11:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
130 Michael Baur
are not of their own making and not subject to their exclusive control as 
individuals. A mind that is not open to the give-and-take of such engage-
ment with other minds is a mind that is not fully rational or free. But it is 
precisely because of the human being’s greater degree of excellence and 
immateriality—the human being’s openness to sharing in the narratives, 
meanings, thoughts, and theories of others—that the human being is also 
subject to greater risks and dangers. We have seen that the animal’s own 
heightened degree of freedom and self-determination (its ability to move 
itself ) made the animal more vulnerable to the workings of its environ-
ment and to the potentially destructive activities of other animals. We can 
now see that, in a similar way, the human being’s own heightened degree of 
freedom and self-determination (its ability to share and participate in the 
meanings and narratives afforded by other human beings) also makes the 
human being more vulnerable to the potentially perverting and destructive 
effects of those meanings and narratives that he or she unavoidably shares 
with others. As human beings, we depend intimately and inescapably on 
the thoughts and narratives of others for our own rationality and our own 
self-understanding. But it is this more intimate and more complete kind of 
sharing and communication, which makes us truly free and rational in the 
ﬁ rst place, that also makes us vulnerable to being co-opted by the distort-
ing, demeaning, and alienating systems of meaning within which we ﬁ nd 
ourselves and which we as ﬁ nite rational individuals can neither control 
nor altogether abandon. The condition of being dependent and vulner-
able in this way is the condition of being tainted by original sin. The sin is 
original because it is an inﬁ rmity that penetrates to the core of our being as 
rational and free beings; but it is still a sin, because it is not something that 
happens to us apart from our own agency, but rather something that we 
bring upon ourselves as the dependent, rational beings that we are.
Five indirectly addresses the problem of original sin—though without 
the off-putting doctrinal label—when the ﬁ lm raises the question of how 
seemingly random and insigniﬁ cant events can play such an important 
role in determining the trajectory of a person’s life. In a scene that fol-
lows Jacek’s conviction and death-sentence, Jacek sits down with Piotr and 
speculates about why he has become the destructive, self-loathing person 
that he is. Five years earlier, Jacek and a friend had been drinking together. 
While drunk, the friend climbed into a tractor and ended up killing Jacek’s 
younger sister as a result of his reckless drunken driving. Jacek clearly feels 
that he is at least partly to blame for the death of his sister, and openly won-
ders whether things might have been different for him if the fatal accident 
had not occurred. On the face of it, it may seem silly to wonder whether 
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such a random accident could have turned Jacek into the directionless, 
nihilistic, murderous person that he has become. But that is not the point 
of Jacek’s rueful musings about the accident; these are not the musings of 
a detached scientist or philosopher wishing to know more about how one 
random event might bring about a chain of other, seemingly unrelated 
events in our causally ordered world. Rather, the point of Jacek’s specula-
tions is that seemingly random and insigniﬁ cant events in our lives (such as 
the act of getting drunk with a friend) can engender unbearable meanings 
for us, meanings that exceed our capacity for coping and for making sense 
of things. Such meanings can exceed our capacity for coping and for mak-
ing sense of things, not because of the intrinsic character of the events out 
of which they arise, but rather because the events take place within systems 
of socialization and communication which are distorted and inadequate, 
and thus incapable of helping us to actualize our proper strivings as human 
beings. When those strivings are frustrated or distorted, they do not cease 
to exist altogether; rather, they become strivings for the wrong sorts of 
things: domination, destruction, and self-aggrandizement at the expense 
of others.
One of the systems of socialization and communication that has a regu-
lar tendency to frustrate and distort our true strivings is the legal system, 
which is ostensibly the primary subject matter of Five. The ﬁ lm opens with 
an image of Piotr as he prepares for his ﬁ nal law-licensing exam, accompa-
nied by a voiceover of Piotr discoursing on the nature and purpose of law. 
In the voiceover, Piotr argues,
The law should not imitate nature, the law should improve nature. 
People invented the law to govern their relationships. The law deter-
mined who we are and how we live. We either observe it, or break it. 
People are free; their freedom is limited only by the freedom of others. 
Punishment means revenge, in particular when it aims to harm, but it 
does not prevent crime. For whom does the law avenge? In the name of 
the innocent? Do the innocent make the rules?
Like the other systems within which we must live, the legal system also has 
a tendency to pervert and distort our proper strivings as human beings. 
The law does not make people better as it should (it does not “improve 
nature”), but in fact makes people worse by reinforcing their destruc-
tive, antisocial behaviors (it “imitates nature,” and in particular the hu-
man being’s baser nature). Since punishment—and in particular, the death 
 penalty—does nothing to prevent or deter crime, the only justiﬁ cation 
for it can be retribution. But retribution, Piotr suggests, amounts to little 
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more than revenge, which is destructive of human beings and their nobler 
aspirations toward love and community.
After Jacek’s trial, conviction, and sentencing, we can see how the re-
tributive, vengeful character of the law harms Jacek and destroys the last 
remaining shreds of humanity that he is trying to salvage in himself. In 
response to his being convicted and sentenced to death, Jacek rightly infers 
that the overriding message of the law is that he is altogether worthless and 
thus unworthy of continued existence as a human being. Piotr tries to cor-
rect Jacek by distinguishing between the crime and the criminal, but Jacek 
will have none of it:
JACEK: They were all against me.
PIOTR: Against what you did.
JACEK: Same thing.
Rather than help Jacek to be the human being that he ought to be, the legal 
system—like so many other systems that mediate our socialization and 
communication with one another— only serves to reinforce Jacek’s self-
loathing and self-destructive behavior.
Jacek is not the only victim of the legal system. Five shows us how the 
legal system can begin to take its toll on people, like Piotr, whose calling is 
ostensibly to dedicate themselves to the law itself. At the beginning of the 
ﬁ lm, we get to know Piotr as someone whose sense of meaning and direc-
tion seems to make him very different from Jacek and Waldemar. Piotr, 
after all, is an idealistic lawyer who believes in the higher goals that the law 
apparently professes for itself; and, as we learn a bit later in the ﬁ lm, he is 
a proud new father. As the ﬁ lm progresses, however, we begin to wonder 
whether the legal system is not also conspiring to undermine Piotr’s ideal-
ism and sense of purpose. After Jacek’s trial, conviction, and sentencing, 
Piotr realizes that he has failed to save a human life from the death penalty, 
even after he had given what, according to the judge, was “the best argu-
ment” against the death penalty that had been presented in a long time. 
At the very end of the ﬁ lm, we see Piotr sitting in his car in a grassy ﬁ eld 
and shouting in anger and desperation, “I abhor it!”—apparently refer-
ring to the legal system that has failed him and failed Jacek. But while the 
legal system has failed him, Piotr feels that he too has failed. Thus he asks 
the judge whether Jacek’s case might have turned out differently, if he had 
made a stronger case for Jacek or if the case had been assigned to another 
defense lawyer. When Piotr learns that he was dining in the café precisely 
at the time that Jacek was in the same café planning his crime, he begins 
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to wonder whether he himself could have acted differently then in order 
to help Jacek. Like Jacek, Piotr has come to show the beginning signs of 
self-doubt and self-loathing, wondering whether things could have turned 
out better if he had only acted differently. Once again, Piotr’s musings 
about what might have been are not the detached, speculative thoughts of 
someone wishing to know about how the causal laws of our universe oper-
ate; they are the musings of someone whose idealism and sense of direction 
are being slowly warped and crushed by our ever-distorted and distorting 
systems of interpersonal communication and socialization.
It was suggested earlier that original sin refers to the perversion or dis-
tortion inscribed in our very being as individuals, insofar as our being as 
individuals depends on systems of interpersonal communication and so-
cialization which are themselves perverted or distorted. The odd thing 
about original sin is that it reverses our otherwise healthy strivings toward 
communication and community, and turns them into their virtual oppo-
site; thus, original sin has the tendency to isolate us and drive us away 
from each other. But insofar as we are alone and isolated, we are deprived 
of community and the nurturing support of others, and thus ultimately 
deprived of what we need to be our true selves. It is altogether appropri-
ate that one of the Christian tradition’s greatest representations of hell—
Dante’s  Comedy—portrays the most forlorn in the inferno (Lucifer) as en-
tirely silent and cold, chest-deep in ice and possessing three mouths which 
are stuffed with the bodies of other sinners ( Judas Iscariot, Brutus, and 
Cassius).8 In the inferno, Lucifer appears to be in the presence of others, 
but he is utterly unable to enjoy any real community or communication 
with them. For the Catholic tradition, hell is not other people (as Jean-Paul 
Sartre would have it) but rather, complete separation from other people, 
the complete failure of community with others.
But when we are alone, when we fail to achieve genuine community 
with others, we also fail to achieve ourselves; we fail to be who we are. 
Thus, there is an intimate connection between sin and self-loathing; and 
in turn, there is an intimate connection between self-loathing and self-
deception. McCabe makes the point nicely:
The root of all sin is fear: the very deep fear that we are nothing; 
the compulsion, therefore, to make something of ourselves, to con-
struct a self-ﬂ attering image of ourselves we can worship, to believe 
in  ourselves— our fantasy selves. I think that all sins are failures in 
being realistic; even the simple everyday sins of the ﬂ esh, that seem to 
come from mere childish greed for pleasure, have their deepest origin 
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in anxiety about whether we really matter, the anxiety that makes us 
desperate for self-reassurance. To sin is always to construct an illusory 
self that we can admire, instead of the real self we can only love. It is 
because we fail in realistic self-love that we fail in love for others. So 
sin, too, means being terriﬁ ed of admitting that we have failed.9
It might be added here that if sin is rooted in the fear of being alone, it 
is equally rooted in the fear of not being with others and not being loved 
and accepted by others for who we really are. This fear of not being loved 
for who we are is what leads us to manufacture false selves that we try to 
sell to others. Even if we succeed in winning the attention and affection 
of others through such false selves, we nevertheless remain fundamentally 
alone—and we are often obliquely aware of this aloneness—because what 
we have offered to others for their love and acceptance is not our true self, 
but rather an idol or image that allows us to remain fundamentally hidden, 
isolated, and alone.
It follows from this that sin or sinfulness represents a kind of slavery 
or thralldom. In our sinfulness, we enslave ourselves to false images, and, 
correspondingly, to false gods that we manufacture for the sake of cover-
ing up our nakedness, our fear and our need. The discovery of the genuine 
God, the God who stands opposed to all forms of idolatry, is the discovery 
of a God who calls us out of such thralldom and invites us to the freedom 
of accepting ourselves and others for who we and they are, even in our and 
their neediness and failure. As McCabe explains:
The only true God is the God of freedom. The other gods make you 
feel at home in a place, they have to do with the quiet cycle of the sea-
sons, with the familiar mountains and the country you grew up in and 
love; with them you know where you are. But the harsh God of freedom 
calls you out of all this into a desert where all the old familiar landmarks 
are gone, where you cannot rely on the safe workings of nature, on 
springtime and harvest, where you must wander over the wilderness 
waiting for what God will bring. This God of freedom will allow you 
none of the comforts of religion. Not only does he tear you away from 
the old traditional shrines and temples of your native place, but he will 
not even allow you to worship him in the old way. You are forbidden 
to make an image of him by which you might wield numinous power, 
you are forbidden to invoke his name in magical rites. You must deny 
the other gods and you must not treat Yahweh as a god, as a power you 
could use against your enemies or to help you succeed in life. Yahweh is 
not a god, there are no gods, they are all delusions and slavery.10
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At this stage, another word of caution is in order. For we need to be care-
ful about attributing to Kies´lowski any theological views or metanarratives 
that are foreign to his way of thinking. As noted above, Kies´lowski main-
tained a critical distance from institutional religion in general and from the 
Roman Catholic Church in particular. He believed that the systems within 
which we live and have our being, including the system of institutionalized 
religion, are often the problem rather than the solution. For Kies´lowski, 
institutionalized religion, like the other systems within which we have our 
being, has a tendency to distort and frustrate our longings for meaning 
and community with others, and so it is not surprising that the only priest 
we encounter in Five says prayers just before Jacek’s execution and thus 
lends an air of divine approbation to the heinous act of killing (Figure 7–1).
Furthermore, through Jacek’s ﬁ nal conversation with Piotr, the ﬁ lm re-
minds us about the Church’s traditional policy of denying Catholic burial 
rites to certain people, thus suggesting that Jacek’s praiseworthy yearning 
for community with his deceased sister (i.e., his desire to be buried near 
her) might well be thwarted, in the end, by the requirements of institution-
alized religion. This is not to say that Kies´lowski denied that there may be 
some system or metanarrative (religious or otherwise) within which we 
might ﬁ nd some genuine meaning and liberation. But even if there is such 
an overarching system or metanarrative, Kies´lowski seems to hold that the 
meaning provided by any such system or metanarrative, whatever it might 
be, remains just beyond our grasp.
The existence of an overarching yet ever-elusive meaning-providing 
metanarrative is suggested by the recurring appearance of a character 
identiﬁ ed in the script only as “the young man” (Artur Barcis´). At decisive 
moments in eight of the ten Decalogue ﬁ lms (he is absent only from Seven 
Figure 7–1. Saying prayers before the execution in 
Decalogue Five.
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and Ten), “the young man” appears as a silent, detached witness who seem-
ingly observes or understands the purpose that mysteriously escapes the 
comprehension of those who are being portrayed in the ﬁ lm, and us who 
are watching the ﬁ lm. In One, “the young man” sits at a campﬁ re near the 
pond where a young boy will later drown; in Two, he is a worker in a hos-
pital where the ﬁ lm’s protagonists are confronted with issues of birth, life, 
love, ﬁ delity and death; in Three, he drives a city tram that narrowly misses 
colliding with and killing the protagonist; in Four, he is seen kayaking on 
the Vistula River and then later carrying the kayak on his back shortly 
before the protagonist makes her fateful decision about whether or not to 
open a mysterious letter; in Five, “the young man” is seen ﬁ rst as an inspec-
tor surveying the road that Waldemar traverses on the way to being killed 
by Jacek, and then later as a ladder-carrying painter in the prison where 
Jacek is to be executed; in Six, he appears ﬁ rst when the protagonist is 
joyously running home after learning about an upcoming date, and then a 
second time when the protagonist runs home after he has been humiliated 
by the date; in Eight, he is a student who listens as the protagonist presents 
a lecture; and in Nine, he is a cyclist who witnesses the attempt by the ﬁ lm’s 
protagonist to commit suicide.
The regular appearance of “the young man” at decisive moments 
throughout the Decalogue series serves to convey the important message 
that there may indeed be an overriding (theological) purpose at work in 
our fallen and alienated world. But his mysterious expression and strange 
silence also convey the sense that any such metanarrative or purpose—
assuming that one is discernible at all—may inescapably remain beyond 
the scope of all possible comprehension by us. Furthermore, Five adds a 
sinister and unique complement to this character who silently witnesses 
events as if from a God’s-eye perspective. In the episode, the appearance of 
“the young man” is echoed and perhaps undermined by the appearance of 
another silent witness: the hideous ornament—a disembodied head with 
a toothy grin—dangling from the windshield of Waldemar’s taxi. At key 
moments in the ﬁ lm, the camera’s perspective calls our attention to the 
presence of this small, silent witness, as if to suggest that the purpose to be 
observed or the metanarrative to be told about the event taking place is not 
a benevolent one at all. As we observers view the regular, silent presence of 
Waldemar’s windshield ornament, we are led to wonder, as Robert Frost 
wonders in his poem, “Design,” whether the purpose behind the seemingly 
random conﬂ uence of events, if there is any such purpose at all, might not 
be malevolent rather than benevolent: “What but design of darkness to 
appall?— / If design govern in a thing so small?”11
F6707.indb   136 4/7/16   6:58:02 AM
This content downloaded from 24.47.19.44 on Sun, 28 Jan 2018 21:11:18 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Decalogue Five 137
Figure 7–2. Waldemar’s Christlike bloody face in 
Deca logue Five.
In spite of the ambiguity confronting us in regard to the overarching 
system or metanarrative that might give Five its meaning, there is no doubt 
that Kies´lowski makes use of overt religious imagery and wants us to think 
about the possibility of an overarching religious system or metanarrative. 
Thus, when Jacek is in the midst of carrying out his murderous deed, Wal-
demar’s bleeding, upturned face presents us with an undeniable image of 
the cruciﬁ ed Christ (Figure 7–2).
As Christopher Garbowski observes:
In the face of the cabdriver victim, who has been strangled and clubbed 
on the head with an iron bar, we seem to see the face of the cruciﬁ ed 
Jesus with blood streaming down his face as if from a crown of thorns. 
The victim appears to look at the murderer as if to forgive him. After 
the deed, the slayer eats the victim’s food, just as the soldiers cast lots 
for Christ’s clothes.12
In response to the Christ imagery that is present in Waldemar’s face, 
Jacek utters the words, “Oh, Jesus” in amazement and in apparent recogni-
tion of the terribleness of his deed. But instead of halting his deed, Jacek 
reacts with renewed violence and uses a large stone to ﬁ nish off what he 
started. In response to the unconditional love and acceptance represented 
by the Christ ﬁ gure, Jacek tenaciously holds on to the false gods and false, 
antisocial sense of purpose that he has created for himself. In this respect, 
he is like the rest of us. As McCabe writes:
As a matter of history one of the peculiar things about man is that when 
he is left to do exactly what he likes he straight away looks around for 
someone to enslave himself to, and if he cannot ﬁ nd a master nearby, he 
will invent one. The Hebrew discovery of God (or God’s revelation of 
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himself to them) begins in their recognition that man historically is a 
slave, and enslaved by his own preference. The true God reveals himself 
as he who summons man out of this degradation that he clings to, who 
summons him to the painful business of being free. (Law, 115–116)
For Kies´lowski, as for the Judeo-Christian tradition, the only remedy 
for our sinful condition is the saving grace of a God, but not one who 
would save us by giving us the falsely comforting shelter of a security 
blanket. The true God is the God who liberates us to face the appalling 
fearfulness of our neediness and our ﬁ nitude head-on. Kies´lowski seems 
to be saying—as Martin Heidegger says in his famous aphorism—“only 
a God can save us.”13 But also like Heidegger, Kies´lowski does not have 
the  metaphysical conﬁ dence to assert that such a God actually exists. His 
reticence about making any such theological pronouncements is rightly 
motivated, for religious talk about God can all too easily devolve into the 
idolatrously comforting talk about gods. If there is to be salvation for us, 
it is to be had—Kies´lowski seems to be saying— only if we undertake the 
frightful but fulﬁ lling activity of entering into genuine community with 
others. For what is the kingdom of God, announced so often in the gospels 
through the image of a wedding party, other than such community with 
others?
In Five, Jacek’s thoughtful yearnings for his deceased sister convey a 
similar message. Jacek’s desire to have an enlarged photograph of his de-
ceased sister implies the desire to bring her back to life (to see her grow 
again), and thus to be in community with her once again. Other moments 
in the ﬁ lm similarly illustrate Jacek’s desire to resurrect his sister and rees-
tablish the only form of community that he ever knew. As we viewers watch 
the ﬁ lm, we, like Jacek, are forced to confront the challenges and pos-
sibilities of genuine community. We are forced to ask ourselves whether 
Jacek, in spite of his terrible crime, is someone in whom we can recognize 
our own humanity, and thus someone with whom we might see ourselves 
in community. In asking these questions, we are in effect asking whether 
Jacek Lazar is alive or dead to us, or, perhaps better, whether his seemingly 
lost humanity, like that of his namesake Lazarus, can be resurrected for 
us. Like the photograph that Jacek wishes to have enlarged, Kies´lowski’s 
ﬁ lm depicts the outward manifestations of a human individual who may be 
alive or dead to us. And just as Jacek suggests with regard to the photo, it is 
impossible to discern from the ﬁ lm alone whether the individual depicted 
is alive or dead; everything depends on how we view the ﬁ lm, and how we 
allow ourselves to be affected by it.
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notes
 1. Krzysztof Kies´lowski, Kies´lowski on Kies´lowski, ed. Danusia Stok (Lon-
don: Faber and Faber, 1993), 145. Further references will be cited in the text 
using the abbreviation KK.
 2. Paul Coates, “Anatomy of a Murder: A Short Film about Killing,” Sight 
and Sound 58, no. 1 (1989): 63.
 3. This feature of the human condition is illustrated especially well in 
Six, in which Tomek seeks to connect with Magda but does not know how to 
do so except by peeping at her through a telescope.
 4. See Christopher Garbowski, Krzysztof Kieslowski’s Decalogue Series: 
The Problem of the Protagonists and Their Self-Transcendence (Boulder, Colo.: 
East European Monographs; New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 7.
 5. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Be-
ings Need the Virtues (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), especially 8–9.
 6. Herbert McCabe, “Original Sin” in God Still Matters, ed. Brian Davies 
(New York: Continuum, 2002), 171–172.
 7. On the account being presented here, to say that the intellect appre-
hends the universal is to say that the intellect apprehends what is in principle 
shareable and thus communicable; by contrast, the sensory faculties appre-
hend what is particular, which is to say that they apprehend what is isolated 
and not shareable except in an indirect way (i.e., what is sensed is shareable 
indirectly, and not through the sensory faculties themselves, insofar as we can 
talk about what we sense).
 8. See Canto XXXIV of Dante’s Inferno, for example, in The Divine Com-
edy of Dante Alighieri: Inferno, trans. Allen Mandelbaum (New York: Bantam, 
1980).
 9. Herbert McCabe, God, Christ and Us (New York: Continuum, 2005), 
17–18.
 10. Herbert McCabe, Law, Love and Language (New York: Continuum, 
2003), 118–119. Further references to this text will be cited using the abbre-
viation Law.
 11. Robert Frost, The Poetry of Robert Frost, ed. Edward Connery Lathem 
(New York: Henry Holt, 1975), 302.
 12. Christopher Garbowski, “Krzysztof Kieslowski’s Decalogue: Presenting 
Religious Topics on Television,” The Polish Review 37, no. 3 (1992): 330.
 13. It was during an interview that Heidegger made his now-famous 
observation, “Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten.” The interview was published 
shortly after Heidegger’s death, in the May 31, 1976, issue of Der Spiegel.
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